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Resumen
El presente estudio analiza las reformas institucionales a la política monetaria en los países de
América Latina desde comienzos de la década de 1990. Se plantea que el haber fortalecido la
autonomía legal de los bancos centrales junto con la aplicación de políticas
macroeconómicas, fue instrumental en la reducción de la inflación, que pasó desde tasas
anuales de tres dígitos en los años noventa, a un solo dígito en el 2004. El artículo también
revisa los principales desafíos actuales que enfrenta la política monetaria, tales como lograr la
estabilidad de precios, recobrar la confianza de los mercados en sus respectivas monedas
locales, y mantener la consistencia de las políticas a pesar de los efectos adversos de la
volatilidad de los flujos de capitales. Por último, se identifican las crisis recurrentes de la
banca y la falta de disciplina fiscal como los principales riesgos que ponen en peligro el éxito
de la política monetaria en las economías latinoamericanas.
Abstract
This study takes stock of the institutional reform of monetary policy in Latin America since
the early 1990s. It argues that strengthening the legal independence of central banks, together
with macroeconomic policies, was instrumental in reducing inflation from three-digit annual
rates in the 1990s to single-digit territory in 2004. The paper also discusses the main
challenges of monetary policy today, namely, achieving price stability, restoring market
confidence in domestic currencies, and sticking to policy consistency despite adverse effects
of the volatility of capital flows. Finally, recurrent banking crises and lack of fiscal discipline
are identified as the main potential risks for the success of monetary policy in Latin America.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
In 1990, average inflation in Latin America reached an unprecedented high of nearly
500 percent. Three of the largest countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) posted
quadruple-digit inflation rates, and no country managed to achieve a single-digit rate. In
contrast, by that time, industrial countries had already lowered inflation to an average of
approximately 4 percent, while Asian countries had brought it down on average to 6 percent.
At the same time, 1990 marked the end of a 10-year period in which per capita GDP in Latin
America fell on average 0.1 percent annually. With standards of living in decline, the
governments in the region faced the need to tackle inflation as a crucial precondition for
restoring sustainable economic growth.
Central banks’ reform was identified a key component of the new economic agenda in most
Latin American countries. The objective of this reform was to restore confidence in monetary
policy and thereby wage a successful war on inflation. To ensure the credibility of the
reforms, Latin American governments decided to implement the institutional changes in a
highly visible way, by passing special laws and, in some cases, by amending the national
constitution. Hence, up to now new central bank legislation has been enacted—in some cases
more than once—in every country but Brazil. Reforms of the central banks led to significant
institutional strengthening and to changes in the design and execution of monetary policy.
2
As a result of these reforms, Latin American central banks became more independent from
their governments—to a greater degree in some countries than in others. The new legislation
gave the central banks operational independence and prohibited their financing of the fiscal
deficit, or at least severely restricted their ability to do so. With monetary policy
independently managed, governments’ chances of having potential expansionary policies
associated with a country's political-business-cycle were markedly reduced. In exchange for
this autonomy, central banks were held accountable with respect to their policy actions and
decisions. Within the central banks, the legal reform encouraged changes both at the policy
level and in the operational framework for the conduct of monetary policy.
Today, except for Costa Rica and Venezuela, the Latin American countries have brought
inflation down to single digits. However, only Chile and Peru, and the dollarized Panama and
Ecuador have managed to make their inflation rates converge to the international rate, as
measured by the level of inflation in the industrial countries.
                                                
2 Central bank reform was undertaken in Chile (1989), El Salvador (1991), Argentina (1992 and 2002),
Colombia (1992), Nicaragua (1992 and 1999), Venezuela (1992, 1999, and 2002), Ecuador (1992 and 1998),
Peru (1993), Mexico (1993), Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), Uruguay (1995), Paraguay (1995), Honduras
(1996 and 2004), Guatemala (2001), and the Dominican Republic (2002). Although Brazil did not pass
legislation to bring about reforms, it pursued social consensus in favor of the operational independence of the
central bank and passed a Fiscal Responsibility Law, which strengthened the central bank’s financial autonomy
and accountability. Ecuador and El Salvador further reformed their central bank legislation in 2000 and 2001,
respectively, but this time to adopt the U.S. dollar as legal tender.2
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to examine the nature of central banks’ reform in
Latin America since the early 1990s and its policy implications, and second, to identify the
main challenges that central banks are still facing today. To this end, section II discusses the
key aspects of the legal reform of Latin American central banks and reviews the main policy
and operational changes adopted in the wake of the central bank reform. Section III
quantifies the degree of legal independence granted to central banks in the region and
ascertains its relationship with the downward inflation trend observed during the 1990s.
Section IV identifies the key challenges facing Latin America's central banks and pinpoints
the main threatens to the success of monetary policy. Section IV sets out the paper's main
conclusions.
II.   THE REFORM OF CENTRAL BANKS AND ITS AFTERMATH
Latin America's central banks are relatively young institutions. Not only did they come into
being more than a century after the countries achieved independence, but they were
established much later than their counterparts in Europe and the United States. Most Latin
America's central banks were created in the 1920s and 1930s.
3
In the course of their history, Latin American central banks experienced several reforms.
Central banks’ ownership evolved from a joint public and private sector participation to one
of exclusive state control. The governing structure of central banks mirrored the nature of
this ownership, since the initial mixed representation of both public and private sectors—
including in the latter representatives of commercial banks and producers' associations—
gradually shifted to a greater government involvement. The modality of formulation of
monetary policy also changed, as governments started to play a larger role around the 1950s,
using central banks to foster economic development. Thus, monetary policy instruments—
such as credit regulation by economic activity and interest rates control—were aligned with
governments’ efforts to spur economic growth. In this environment, central banks rather
played the role of development banks, and therefore, did not operate independently from
policy-makers to formulate and execute monetary and exchange rate policy, with price
stability being, at most, a secondary objective.
                                                
3 The central banks of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Bolivia, and Guatemala were all founded in the
1920s, whereas the central banks of Peru, Argentina, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Venezuela were established
in the 1930s. The central banks of Brazil and Uruguay as they exist today separated from other government
agencies only in the 1960s.3
A.   The Institutional Reform
Starting with Chile in 1989, Latin America's central bank legislation was extensively
amended with the aim of arresting inflation.
4 The reform implied an institutional
strengthening of central banks based on four main criteria: (i) a clear mandate that places
priority on maintaining price stability; (ii) political independence to design monetary policy;
(iii) operational autonomy; and (iv) accountability with respect to the policy mandate.
5 The
main features of this reform are discussed below, with applications to all countries in the
region, except for the three formally dollarized economies (Ecuador, El Salvador, and
Panama).
Central banks’ objective
Today, all central bank laws in the region establish that the purpose of the central bank is to
ensure price stability or currency stability. This the single mandate in seven countries while
in other eight central banks are given other objectives as well, without defining priority,
which in some cases potentially create policy conflicts (Table 1). This is the situation in
Brazil, where, de jure, the central bank is also responsible for fostering or creating conditions
conducive to growth and economic development.
6 When the objective of maintaining price
stability is established together—with no indication of priority—with preserving the stability
of the financial system (Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay), the central bank may also face
potential conflicting objectives, in particular during periods of stress in the banking system.
7
A similar situation may arise when the central bank is equally responsible of maintaining the
external value of the currency (Costa Rica and Honduras), which will be binding in times of
large capital inflows. In any case, having multiple objectives makes more difficult to assess
the accountability of central banks.
                                                
4 The theoretical underpinnings of this reform—implemented in industrial and developing countries alike—are
derived from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), who showed that, when
faced with a choice between higher inflation and lower unemployment, governments generally favored higher
inflation. The institutional reform was, in a great extent, inspired in Rogoff’s notion (Rogoff, 1985) of turning
over monetary policy to a “conservative central banker,” with the aim of reducing the so-called “inflation bias.”
5 Jácome (2003) summarizes the main features of central bank legislation in Latin America.
6 Since the latter is a broad objective, the legal mandate of the central bank may give rise to differing
interpretations when it comes to formulate monetary policy. In practice, this potential policy conflict has not
been relevant, in particular since the issue of the inflation targeting executive decree in 1999.
7 Although in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay the central bank performs both monetary
policy and financial supervision, the conventional wisdom claims that the objective of maintaining the stability
of the financial system should be subordinated to that of maintaining price stability like in Argentina.4
Table 1. Mandate of the Central Bank
Price stability plus other objectives, with no indication of priority
Price stability as the
sole or primary
objective.
Operation of the payment
system.
Stability of the financial
system or external











Source: Latin American national constitutions and central bank legislation as of 2004.
Political autonomy
Following the institutional reform, Latin American central banks are more autonomous from
governments although there is still room for improvement in a number of countries. In
severing the link between the central bank and the executive branch, in some countries the
reform expanded central banks' decision-making horizon such that monetary policy is not
subordinated anymore to the countries' electoral calendars. As observed in Table 2, today
central banks’ board of directors are appointed for a tenure that exceeds or overlaps with the
country’s constitutional term, rarely including private sector representatives or from other
public sector entities. What is more important, the law requires in many countries that the
Congress confirm these appointments or, in some cases, to appoint them following executive
branch nominations.
8 As a key feature of political independence, in a number of countries the
new legislation specifies legal grounds for removing the governor and the members of the
central bank board of directors and places the final decision in the hands of the legislative or
the judicial branch.
9 Yet, in a number of cases, the legislation establishes grounds for
removal of central bank governors and members of the board, which relate to policy
decisions.
                                                
8 In few countries, the law differentiates procedures for the central bank governor and its executive board, as the
former is typically appointed and removed by the executive branch, while the latter is appointed and removed
by the legislative branch.
9 Guatemala is the emblematic case in point, as the Congress has the right to dismiss the governor of the central
bank —with a qualified majority—if it considers that his annual appearance before the Legislature to report on
the conduct of monetary policy and the achievement of its policy objective is not satisfactory (Article 60 of the
Organic Law of the Bank of Guatemala).5
Table 2. Political Autonomy
Tenure  of the Board of Directors vis à vis the President of the Republic's Term of Office 1/
Longer Same length, but non-concurrent Same length, shorter length, or not
specified
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica,
Mexico, Venezuela
Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala Brazil, Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay
Structure of the Board
No representation from the
executive branch or the private
sector.
The executive branch is
represented directly through
ministers of State.
In addition to the executive branch,
the private sector is also
represented.
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay.
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua, Venezuela.
Guatemala.
Who Appoints or Confirms Members of the Board of Directors
Legislative branch
appoints and/or confirms
Executive branch alone Between the executive
and the legislative branch
With the involvement of
the private sector
Argentina, Bolivia,





Peru, Venezuela. Guatemala, Nicaragua.
Mechanism for Removal
Strictly on legal grounds On non-legal grounds or for economic policy reasons
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela.
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay.
Who Decides upon Removal









Source: Latin American national constitutions and central bank legislation as of 2004
1/ In some cases, such as Costa Rica, the governor of the central bank is appointed for the same term as the
president, but the other members of the executive board are appointed for a longer term.
Operational independence
The autonomy to formulate and execute monetary policy is probably the most common
feature of the central bank reform in Latin America. In particular, the reform assigned
operational independence to central banks, which implied freedom to use all monetary
instruments to achieve policy targets.
10 To strengthen operational autonomy, central banks
                                                
10 In some countries (Mexico and Venezuela, for instance), the government has retained the power to co-
participate in the formulation of exchange rate policy, which has the potential for interfering operational
independence. However, this potential restriction is non-binding under flexible exchange rate regimes.6
are severely restricted, and in some cases prohibited, of financing public expenditure (see
Table 3).
11 The prohibition of monetizing the fiscal deficit reflects the consensus achieved in
the region that financing the fiscal deficit has historically been the main root of the chronic
inflation that afflicted the region.
Operational independence also implies that central banks are empowered to manage their
own interest rates, thereby influencing commercial banks’ interest rates, and those of other
financial instruments.
12 Nonetheless, operational independence is some times undermined as
a result of central banks’ losses arising from the discharge of their functions. Given that in
most countries in Latin America governments are not required to make up for central bank
losses, or there is no statutory requirement for recapitalization if reported capital drops below
zero (see Table 3), persistent large losses may undermine the operating independence of
central banks and eventually curtail the effectiveness of monetary policy actions.
13, 14 In the
event that operating losses become a perennial distortion, like in a number of central banks in
the region, markets may cast doubts about central banks’ long-term ability to preserve price
stability.
There are other situations where central banks' autonomy to conduct monetary policy is
restricted. An undesirable situation is that of Guatemala, where the national Congress
approves the issue of central bank paper for open-market-operations purposes, a situation that
may potentially inhibit the conduct of monetary policy. In addition, there are central banks
that do not have financial independence as Congress approves their budget (like in Honduras
and Paraguay), which may lead to a lack of the resources needed to accomplish their
responsibilities.
                                                
11 Nonetheless, the spirit of this restriction has been violated based on alternative legal grounds. A case in point
is Venezuela, where the central bank law requires the central bank to transfer to the government unrealized
profits associated to the revaluation of international reserves. Another violation occurs in countries where the
annual budget approved by law in Congress requires central banks to make transferences to the government,
like in Honduras and Paraguay, for example.
12 Exactly how interest rates respond to actions taken by the central bank depends essentially on what impact the
latter have on inflationary expectations. Changes in interest rates and expectations, in turn, affect aggregate
supply and demand, and hence, economic activity and inflation.
13 The accumulation of central bank losses may limit either their capacity to mop up excess liquidity or their
ability to raise interest rates when conducting open-market-operations, as they become an undesirable source of
monetization that will require subsequent efforts of sterilization.
14 To avoid extending a blank check from the government to central bank, the latter should make transparent
their operational expenses, including the aggregate wage bill and other administrative outlays.7
Table 3. Operational Independence
Credit to the Government by the Central Bank
No direct or indirect credit, or
credit extended on the secondary
market with limits.
Credit to cope with seasonal liquidity
shortages, or credit extended on the
secondary market without limits.
Direct credit approved with
special majority.







Independence in the Use of Monetary Policy Instruments
Full independence in monetary
and exchange rate policy
Restrictions or government influence




Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru,
Uruguay.
Guatemala, Paraguay. Colombia, Mexico,
Venezuela.
Financial Independence
Government is required to
maintain central bank's capital.
Government is authorized but is not
required to capitalize the central bank,
or capitalizes it with nonnegotiable
bonds.






Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Mexico. Argentina, Costa Rica,
Paraguay, Uruguay.
Source: Latin American national constitutions and central bank legislation as of 2004, and Fiscal
Responsibility Law in Brazil.
Accountability
Accountability requirements are an innovating feature of the legislation governing most
central banks in Latin America (see Table 4). The purpose of this reform was to hold central
banks accountable in exchange for the substantial independence they were granted. Until the
reform, central banks in the region typically published an annual report describing the overall
economic performance of the countries, which served essentially as an historical record and
not as an accountability procedure. Following the reforms of the 1990s, central bank
governors in most countries are required to appear before the legislature to report on the
conduct of monetary policies and the performance in pursuing their objective of preserving
price stability. In addition, central banks publish regularly its monetary program for the
foreseeable future, in a number of cases, together with an inflation report that assesses central
banks’ actions aimed at achieving the inflation targets.8
Table 4. Central Bank Accountability
Reporting by the Central Bank
Formal appearance before the legislature. Submission of a report to the executive or legislative
branch, or publication of a report in the news media.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Paraguay, Venezuela.
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, Mexico.
Publication and Transparency of Information
Financial statements certified by
external auditors.
Financial statements certified by a
public agency separated from the
central bank.
Financial statements signed by an






Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Peru.
Source: Latin American national constitutions and central bank legislation as of 2004, and Fiscal
Responsibility Law in Brazil.
A critical component of central banks' accountability is the transparency of their policy
discussions and decisions and the disclosure of financial transactions. The former has rarely
been incorporated as a legal requirement, although it is an increasingly popular practice, in
particular in countries under inflation targeting. In turn, the transparency of central banks’
income statements is already a plus in the legislation of a number of countries in Latin
America, although there is room for improvement in some other central banks (Table 4).
While practically all central banks disclose their financial statements on a regular basis, best
practices advice the certification of an external audit firm, which verifies that central banks'
transactions have been properly recorded in accordance with international accounting
standards. In fact, a number of central banks in the region do not account properly
operational losses and eventually they hide negative capital positions.
In sum, Latin American countries have made significant progress in strengthening central
banks institutional foundations but more is needed. The major achievements refer to the
augmented operational autonomy that central banks enjoy today and to the accountability
requirements that they must observe. However, there is still room for improvement. A
number of central banks would benefit from having an unequivocal mandate that requires
them to focus their policies in achieving and preserving price stability. Several countries
should reduce governments’ discretional room for the removal of central bank governors—
and members of the board of directors—as this will contribute to bear the fruits of the
enhanced independence granted to central banks. Finally, increasing the transparency and
dissemination of monetary policy decisions in many central banks in the region will boost
their policy effectiveness, whereas requiring a government commitment to maintain central
bank’s capital integrity—without extending a blank check in favor of central banks—will
underpin monetary policy’s operational independence.9
B.   Changes in the Formulation of Monetary Policy
The reform of central bank legislation laid the ground for subsequent changes in the regime
of monetary policy and in the modality of policy operation in a number of countries. Central
banks in Latin America increasingly migrated from exchange rate pegs towards exchange
rate flexibility, although this swing was mostly triggered by financial crises. Instead of
adopting a monetary anchor, central banks increasingly adopted—or are in the process of
adopting—an inflation targeting (IT) regime as a way of anchoring inflation expectations. In
addition, a growing number of central banks shifted to—or are in the process of moving
toward—an operational framework that is based on the use of a short-term interest rate as a
policy rate, with less emphasis in monitoring monetary aggregates as intermediate targets.
The shift to exchange rate flexibility
At the beginning of the decade, with the region hovering triple-digit inflation, most countries
embarked on stabilization strategies based on a nominal exchange rate anchor. This monetary
policy arrangement usually involved exchange rate bands that were supported by growing
capital inflows into the region. As of 1995, only five of the 18 Latin American countries had
a flexible regime (Table 5). All other countries featured a fixed or "super-fixed” exchange
regimes, or some intermediate arrangement such as crawling pegs or horizontal and crawling
bands—which in terms of expectations worked as if they were fixed pegs. On these grounds,
most central banks abdicated, to a great extent, their ability to perform monetary policy.
Table 5. Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America
(De facto classification)




2/ Floating exchange rates 
3/
1990 Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Panama.
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,














2004 El Salvador, Ecuador, Panama,
Venezuela.







Source: Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) and "Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions," International Monetary Fund (2004).
1/ Includes regimes involving formal dollarization, a monetary union, a currency board, or fixed exchange rates
pegged to one currency or a basket of currencies.
2/ Includes regimes involving horizontal bands (forward looking and backward looking) crawling pegs, and
forward looking and backward looking crawling bands.
3/ Includes managed float and free float regimes.10
Today the number of Latin American countries with flexible exchange rates has doubled.
However, the transition to more flexibility took place amid financial crises—and in some
cases unsustainable fiscal imbalances—that made intermediate exchange rate regimes
unsustainable.
15 The number of countries that formally dollarized also increased—to three—
reinforcing the bipolar trend in the choice of exchange rate regimes (Fischer, 2001). A small
group of countries—mostly in Central America—kept the exchange rate as the nominal
anchor given their increasing integration with the U.S. economy.
The transition to exchange rate flexibility was traumatic in most cases as it sparked swift and
steep devaluations. Nonetheless, the enhanced autonomy of central banks facilitated the
conduct of monetary policy in a flexible exchange rate environment, and hence, most
countries reestablished soon the downward trend of inflation. While the affection for
exchange rate pegs was not restored, many central banks did not return either to monetary
targeting regimes. Central banks discarded exchange rate pegs due to their intrinsic
vulnerability to exogenous shocks and because they proved highly vulnerable to speculative
attacks due to large fiscal imbalances, all of which eventually resulted in costly currency and
banking crises. Monetary targeting was not considered an alternative either as central banks
found difficult to predict the course of monetary aggregates in the short-run due to unstable
money demand and volatile money multipliers.
With the purpose of reestablishing a nominal anchor, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and
Peru instituted IT schemes by the late-1990s and early 2000s.
16 The reform of central banks
provided the institutional underpinnings for adopting IT in those countries.
17 Today there is
consensus in the profession with respect to the need of having an unequivocal policy mandate
of preserving price stability, a strong political and operational independence, and stringent
accountability practices, as prerequisites for successfully adopting IT. In turn, the enhanced
transparency of central banks’ decision-making and the potential for building credibility are
also predicated on the institutional strength provided by the reform of central banks.
Innovations to the operational framework
With the aim of fostering the effectiveness of monetary policy, central banks working under
flexible exchange arrangements changed their operational framework and procedures. They
increasingly migrated from the traditional regime of controlling the money base—or some
                                                
15 México and Venezuela in the mid-1990s and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay towards the
late 1990s and early 2000s are cases in point.
16 Yet, a number of other countries are in the process of building the blocks for the future adoption of IT.
17 In Brazil, in the absence of a broad reform of the central bank, the government issued an executive decree to
institute the IT regime and included in the Fiscal Responsibility Law some aspects that strengthened central
bank’ financial independence and transparency11
other monetary aggregate—as an intermediate target to an alternative scheme where central
banks typically use a short-run interest rate as an operational variable. With the adoption of
this operational variable, central banks seek to influence the behavior of longer-term interest
rates, including those charged by financial intermediaries, which, in turn, are expected to
influence aggregate demand and aggregate supply, and hence, inflation.
18 In this connection,
the operational target has become a key factor in affecting the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
Most central banks adopted the overnight interest rate—rather than a quantity variable—as
their operational or policy variable (Table 6).
19 To steer interbank interest rates close to the
operational variable, these central banks forecast and manage systemic banks liquidity and
engage in open-market-operations using overnight repo—and reverse repo—operations.
Because the interbank rate may be subject to excessive volatility, central banks are
increasingly adopting an interest rate corridor. The floor of the corridor is typically the
overnight rate applicable to a deposit facility, instituted to serve financial intermediaries that
did not want, or were unable, to place their excess liquidity on the interbank market at the
end of the day. In turn, the ceiling of the corridor is usually the rate charged by the central
bank to financial intermediaries requesting overnight liquidity assistance.
Table 6. Main Characteristics of Monetary Policy Operating Framework







Argentina Monetary base Daily No None
Brazil Overnight interest rate Daily Yes Interest rate
Chile Overnight interest rate Daily Yes Interest rate
Colombia Overnight interest rate Daily Yes Interest rate
Dominican Repub. Net domestic assets* Weekly Yes None
Guatemala 7-days interest rate Weekly No Interest rate
Mexico Bank liquidity Daily No Liquidity
Paraguay Net domestic assets* No No None
Peru Overnight interest rate Daily Yes Interest rate
Uruguay Monetary base (monthly
average)
Daily No Monetary base
* This is a de facto variable in the framework of the economic program these countries have negotiated with
the IMF. Strictly speaking, it is more of an intermediate variable, in terms of traditional financial
programming, rather than an operational variable.
                                                
18 The impact on the real sector of the economy is a direct function of the development of the financial market,
especially the interbank market.
19 In industrialized countries there is a general trend to use the short-term interest rate as the operational
variable. In Latin America, Mexico is an exception as it uses a quantity variable (the corto).12
In addition, central banks, in particular in IT countries, generally use the policy rate to signal
changes in the stance of monetary policy and to boost the effectiveness of policy decisions.
For instance, they increase the policy rate in anticipation of inflationary pressures and
decrease it light of the opposite scenario. Central banks’ monetary policy committees
typically adopt these decisions during preannounced meetings and immediately disclose and
explain the underlying reasons of the change in the policy stance. In adopting these rules,
central banks seek to foster transparency and enhance predictability, thereby encouraging the
alignment of the market’s inflation expectations with central banks’ targets.
III.   MEASURING CENTRAL BANK REFORM
The analysis that follows quantifies central bank independence (CBI) in Latin America to
gauge the institutional impact of the reform, in particular on inflation. To obtain a more
tangible view about the implications of the reform, we first calculate an index of legal CBI
for each country applied to the pre and post-reform legislation and then discuss its likely
contribution in explaining the sustained downward trend in inflation observed over the
1990s.
20 A simple econometric exercise is found in the appendix of this document.
A.   The Independence of Central Banks in Latin America Now—and Then
To measure the independence of central banks, an index of legal CBI is calculated using a
slightly modified version of the Cukierman index (Cukierman, 1992), which incorporates
additional features such as accountability of central banks.
21 The proposed analysis keeps
track of legal CBI during the pre and post reform periods and provides comparative
information in a cross section dimension. The index of CBI is applied to the old and new
legislation governing central banks, including the relevant parts of the countries’
constitutions.
22
The index of legal CBI is built on the spirit of the Cukierman index. It uses five criteria to
capture different aspects that are relevant in measuring legal CBI. After applying different
weights for each criterion, the resulting value of the CBI index gives a score that varies in the
scale between zero and one. The first criterion measures the political independence of central
                                                
20 Measuring legal CBI is also subject to the usual criticism about the degree of subjectivity that building an
index incorporates. Despite its flaws, legal indexes of CBI still convey information about the institutional
grounds on which the autonomy of monetary policy is predicated.
21 The differences between the Cukierman index and the modified index used in this paper are described in
Jácome and Vázquez (2005). This paper found a high degree of correlation between this and the Cukierman
index.
22 In the case of Brazil, the legal framework also included the relevant provisions in the Fiscal Responsibility
Law approved in 2000, which strengthen financial independence and accountability of the Central Bank of
Brazil.13
banks by assessing the modality of appointment of central banks’ board of directors, the
length of their tenure—relative to the term of the executive branch—and the legal provisions
for their removal (20 percent). The second criterion refers to the nature of the central bank's
mandate, assigning high marks to those central banks that pursue primarily the objective of
preserving price stability (15 percent), whereas the third relates to the autonomy of central
banks in the formulation of monetary policy (15 percent). The fourth criterion assesses
central bank's restrictions in lending provisions to the government and to commercial banks
as a lender of last resort, as well as its financial independence (40 percent). The fifth one
evaluates central banks' accountability requirements (10 percent).
23 The results of the legal
CBI applied to the Latin American economies are posted in Table 7.
Table 7. Legal Central Bank Independence in Latin America
(Based on constitutions and central bank laws as of end-2004)
Group 1 CBI Group 2 CBI Group 3 CBI
Peru-1 0.862 Argentina-1 0.788 Nicaragua-0 0.590
Chile-1 0.846 Venezuela-1 0.750 Guatemala-0 0.565
Bolivia-1 0.825 Nicaragua-1 0.733 Costa Rica-0 0.510
Colombia-1 0.806 Guatemala-1 0.728 Peru-0 0.502
Dominican Republic-1 0.805 Costa Rica-1 0.705 Dominican Republic-0 0.435
Mexico-1 0.805 Paraguay-1 0.702 Uruguay-0 0.435
Uruguay-1 0.669 Venezuela-0 0.395
Brazil */ 0.641 Mexico-0 0.388






Average Group 1 0.825 Average Group 2 0.704 Average Group 3 0.412
*/ Incorporates provisions from the Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000) and a Constitutional amendment (2003)
that strengthened central bank’s independence.
Note: Country–1 refers to the measurement post-reforms, while Country–0 refers to the measurement prior to
the reforms.
The numbers show that central banks enjoy today greater legal independence today than they
did in 1990, although it varies markedly across countries. Except for Brazil that did not
reform its central bank law, in all countries legal independence rose significantly following
the reform as measured by the index of CBI—from 0.412 to 0.765. However, current legal
independence is not uniform across countries. Table 5 identifies two groups of reformer
countries. Group 1 encompasses those countries where central banks became more
independent, which have a legal CBI index of 0.80 and more (Peru, Chile, Bolivia,
                                                
23 Jácome and Vázquez (2005) discuss the specifics of this index.14
Colombia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic). The remaining countries, Group 2, have
less independent central banks as the legal CBI index is in the range of 0.60 to 0.79, but still
more independent than in their pre-reform status (Group 3).
Table 8. Breakdown of Legal CBI into its Five Main Criteria
(Based on constitutions and central bank laws as of end-2004)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Government of the Central Bank 0.708 0.575 0.301
Central Bank primary objective 0.958 0.556 0.143
Policy formulation 0.762 0.776 0.681
Central Bank lending 0.864 0.773 0.469
Accountability 0.917 0.868 0.402
Progress has not been uniform either in all fronts of the institutional reform (Table 8).
Breaking down the legal CBI index into its five key criteria (the first four consistent with the
Cukierman index—albeit with slight variations—plus accountability), major differences arise
among the reformed legislation in terms of the political autonomy assigned to central banks
and, in particular, in relation to the primary objective assigned to central banks.
Alternatively, the autonomy to formulate monetary policy is virtually uniform in all
countries. On the other hand, the differences are evident in all five criteria with respect to the
pre-reform status.
B.   CBI and Inflation Performance in Latin America
Given that the reform of central banks was fundamentally conceived to wage a successful
war on inflation, it is inevitable to ask whether it indeed contributed to the dramatic fall in
inflation of the last 15 years in Latin America. A recent paper by Jácome and Vázquez
(2005) finds that the legal CBI, together with other macroeconomic variables and controlling
for external inflation, is statistically significant in explaining inflation performance in Latin
American and Caribbean between 1990 and 2002.
24 A similar outcome is obtained using the
same model and restricting the sample only to the Latin American countries (see the
Appendix).
25
                                                
24 The result holds for two alternative measures of legal CBI, namely the Cukierman index (Cukierman, 1992)
and the Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini index (Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini, 1991).
25 A more rigorous analysis would have required measuring de facto CBI and not only de jure CBI, but this task
exceeds the scope of this paper. The difference between de jure and de facto independence is relevant, in
particular in countries where institutions are weak.15
Figure 1: CBI and Inflation in Latin America  







































To have a flavor of this relationship, Figure 1 illustrates the negative relationship between
legal CBI and inflation focused only on the Latin American region. The index of legal CBI is
calculated for the pre and post-reform periods and paired with average inflation for the same
years. The pre-reform period covers the five years prior to the reform of the central bank in
each country, including the year in which legal changes materialized, while the time span
following the reform covers up to 2003.
26 The statistically significant negative correlation
holds despite the noise introduced by the numerous financial crises that hit the region during
the last ten years, which temporarily boosted inflation in a number of countries.
27
The same relationship does not hold, however, when the fiscal deficit is associated—
measured through the non-financial public sector deficit—with inflation (Figure 2).
28 This
outcome seems to suggest that restricting central bank from financing the fiscal deficit did
not necessarily imposed greater fiscal discipline, and rather that governments replaced this
money with other sources of financing, mainly public debt (see Section IV). In addition,
while the reform of central banks contributed to reduce inflation, there is no empirical
evidence of causality as reported in Jácome and Vazquez (2005), suggesting that many
central banks in Latin America adopted central bank reforms when inflation was already
falling. Thus, the institutional reform of monetary policy served mostly to consolidate the
regional downward trend rather than to trigger a fall of inflation.
                                                
26 Exceptionally, the post-reform period considered for Ecuador goes up only to 1999 and for El Salvador only
to 2000, when those two countries adopted the U.S. dollar as legal tender.
27 See Jácome (2005) for a characterization of banking crises in Latin America during the last 15 years.
28 The series on the non-financial public sector deficit are built on information obtained from the country reports
elaborated regularly by the IMF staff.16
Figure 2: CBI and Fiscal Deficit in Latin America


























Source: the Non financial public sector is obtained from IMF’s staff reports.
IV.   CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA'S CENTRAL BANKS
Despite the success in reducing inflation, central banks in Latin America still face important
challenges in the perspective of conquering inflation and preserving price stability in the
long-run.
29 First, inflation in most Latin American countries has yet to converge to price
stability. Second, a number of them need to restore confidence in the domestic currency, not
only as a mean of transaction, but also as a store of value. An third, central banks needs to
cope with capital inflows without sacrificing the objective of attaining and preserving price
stability. Overcoming these difficulties, however, is not only a central bank duty since
governments also bear some responsibilities, in particular, preserving the stability of the
financial system and maintaining fiscal deficits on check.
While this document provides general recommendations to cope with today’s main central
bank challenges, more specific proposals are needed. They should be widely analyzed in
years to come as part of the research agenda of central banks in the region and, to some
extent, of the multilateral financial institutions.
                                                
29 We refer as price stability to a situation that features low and stable inflation, in the range of one to four
percent on an annual basis.17
A.   Achieving Price Stability
While inflation in Latin America has already declined in average to single digits, in the vast
majority of countries it has not yet converged to the world inflation. When measuring
inflation for the period 2003-2005, only four countries in the region reached a rate below 4
percent, with two of them having been formally dollarized. Likewise, more than one half of
all countries—including the dollarized economies—featured a rate that exceeded 8 percent in
average in the same period (see Figure 3), which is approximately the threshold identified in
the empirical literature as carrying costs in terms of economic growth.
30 In 2005, the number
of countries with inflation rates in the two-digit territory has increased given the recent
upward trend—albeit moderate—resulting from the impact of the persistent oil shock.
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   Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF, and data up to October 2005.
Further reducing inflation should be a key goal of central banks in Latin America. However,
this may be an increasingly difficult endeavor because of its potential adverse effects in
short-term output.
31 While in the 1990s governments in the region seemed to unconditionally
support anti-inflation policies as a vital social objective, today this emphasis has lost
momentum, and rather, governments are prioritizing efforts to spur economic growth—after
three years of negative growth in per-capita GDP and three decades of very modest
                                                
30 See Sarel (1996), which places the threshold at 8 percent, and the more recent work by Khan and Senhadji
(2000) which, for developing countries only, places the threshold in the range of 7 to 11 percent.
31 In the last ten years there has been increased attention in the industrial countries to the analysis of the
negative effects on output stemming from disinflation efforts, in particular following the institutional reform
that strengthened central banks independence. In this connection, Fischer (1995), Fischer (1996), and Gartner
(1997) found empirical evidence of a positive correlation between central bank independence and the “sacrifice
ratio.” Furthermore, Andersen and Wascher (1999) claim that the “trade-off” between inflation and growth—in
industrial countries—intensifies when inflation is below 8 per cent.18
improvement. Under these conditions, central banks may face a political environment
opposed to tight monetary policies.
Nonetheless, central banks must persevere on seeking the objective of price stability as a
primary goal although simultaneously minimizing the potential adverse effects on output. To
this end, the key ingredient is to keep along the path of strengthening central banks’
reputation and credibility.
32 The more solid is central banks’ reputation and credibility, the
lower are real interest rates required to maintain simultaneously price stability and a stable
path of output growth. Achieving this goal, however, depends on the combination of policy
and institutional factors.
Implementing a more efficient monetary policy hinges not only on central banks’ ability to
conduct monetary policy, but also on making central banks’ policy more transparent and
predictable.
33 While central banks in the region, especially IT central banks, have already
enhanced accountability and transparency standards following their institutional reform, there
is still room for improvement. Based on the international standards adopted to measure the
transparency of monetary policy,
34 in average, Latin America ranks behind Europe, Asia, and
Middle East and Central Asia in monetary policy transparency. As illustrated in Figure 4, the
percentage of criteria of the code of transparency of monetary policy that are “fully
observed” or “broadly observed” is 76 percent in Latin America against more than 90
percent, both in Asia and Europe, and 80 percent in Middle East and Central Asia.
35 On the
other hand, if central banks react consistently when faced with exogenous and policy-induced
shocks and explain their policies for fighting inflation, the market will be able to anticipate
central bank reactions. In this environment, market participants will face less uncertainty,
which will make them more inclined to align inflation expectations with central bank targets,
thereby improving the short-run trade-off between inflation and economic growth.
                                                
32 The difference between these two policy features is subtle and difficult to separate. One form of separating
these two concepts is to associate reputation with the stock of monetary policy successes—the accumulated past
achievements in terms of inflation—and to link credibility with the public’s assessment of current monetary
policy (Siklos, 2002).
33 The link between more transparency and less inflation has not received much attention in the literature, but it
is subject of increasing interest by academics and practitioners. Chortareas and others (2002) provide empirical
support in industrial countries.
34 See the IMF’s Transparency Code for Good Practices in Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of
Principles (1999). The assessment of transparency practices is conducted on a qualitative basis using five
categories: observed, broadly observed, partially observed, non-observed, and not applicable.
35 Not all countries in the region are included in the sample as they have not been yet evaluated. Specifically,
the assessment does not include important players such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela.19
Figure 4. Transparency of Monetary Policy 







































































        Source: Standards and Codes Gateway (Monetary and Financial Systems Department, IMF).
In addition to what central banks can do to fulfill their mandate of arresting inflation, their
autonomy should receive the support of governments and societies. At present, the record of
instability of central bank governors in their posts raise concerns about whether central banks
are autonomous in practice. Using the turnover rate of central bank governors as a proxy for
effective central bank independence, and assuming that the higher the turnover rate the lower
is the independence of central banks,
36 we found that the average rate in Latin America is
approximately 0.4 during the post reform period.
37 Thus, in average, a central bank governor
remains in office for about two and a half years.
38 This period, however, is clearly smaller
than the term of appointment of central bank governors in the region—typically between four
and six years. In addition, it is well below the effective term of central bank governors in
industrial countries.
39 By country, Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico seem to have the most
stable central bank authorities, whereas Brazil and Ecuador feature the least stable (Figure
                                                
36 A similar indicator has been used previously in the literature (see Cukierman, 1992 and more recently, De
Haan and Kooi, 2000), although it has also been criticized under the argument that it may also imply a lack of
political autonomy, as docile central bank governors will have better chances of remaining in their posts.
37 The turnover rate of central bank governors was obtained by dividing the number of central bank governors
by the number of years following the enactment of the new law that instituted central banks’ autonomy in each
country—until 2004. Thus, the lower is this rate, the more stable have been central banks authorities, and
presumably, more independent they have been from a political perspective.
38 This outcome does not experience any major change when the sample is restricted by excluding the non-
reforming countries during most of the period of analysis (Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala).
39 For the sake of comparison, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve remains in
post since 1987, whereas in the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England governors typically complete their
period of appointment—7 and 10 years, respectively.20
5).
40 The high rate of turnover of central bank governors in some Latin American countries
suggests that monetary authorities remain vulnerable to periods of political instability.
Figure 5. Turover Rate of Central bank Governors 
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B.   Pesos rather than Dollars
A second key challenge facing most central banks in Latin America is to restore markets’
confidence in domestic currencies. High dollarization is in general a legacy of periods of
high inflation, although recurrent periods of financial instability and full-fledged banking
crises have also encouraged dollarization. The demand for foreign currency has also
gradually increased in countries that decided to sacrifice their monetary “independence” by
tying their currency—to one degree or another—to the U.S. dollar in order to reduce inflation
or to preserve external competitiveness of tradable activities. Thus, despite the regional
downward trend in inflation, dollarization has remained high in several countries (Figure 6).
                                                
40 For Ecuador, the rate corresponds to the period 1992-1999 and for El Salvador 1991-2000, when the central
bank reform was adopted and before dollarization was formally instituted in each country. For Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, and Guatemala, the whole period 1990-2003 was applied.21




































































































































































































































































































































































Dollar deposits / total deposits Inflation
                Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.22
While financial dollarization entails some benefits, there is growing consensus about the
limitations it imposes for the conduct of monetary policy and the restrictions it entails for
managing banking crises.
41 After periods of high inflation, financial dollarization provides a
deposits’ base, which would not have been possible to preserve should they be denominated
in domestic currency, thereby encouraging financial intermediation and financial sector
growth. However, as money base in domestic currency shrunk, central banks have only a
small room for maneuver and, in practice, they focus mainly on achieving high levels of
international reserves and on preserving exchange rate stability, which in the end becomes
the nominal anchor. Moreover, in the event of banking crises, financial dollarization restricts
central bank’s capacity as lender of last resort and limits the scope for the provision of
additional credible financial safety nets, given central banks’ inability of issuing foreign
currency.
The legacy of past periods of high inflation
A number of central banks in Latin America succeeded in reducing inflation but failed to
restore confidence in the domestic currencies. After several years—and even decades—of
high inflation in a number of countries, markets have not recover confidence in the domestic
currency, in particular in terms of its role as a store of value. As a result, financial distortions
endure, particularly a high level of dollarization and, in a number of cases, the so-called
“peso problem.”
Financial dollarization rocketed during the 1990s despite the decline in inflation, reaching in
some cases more than 80 percent—like in Bolivia and Uruguay. Against this background,
central banks developed the syndrome of “fear of floating” the exchange rate and are
compelled to maintain sizeable volumes of international reserves as a buffer to tackle
potential speculative attacks and banks’ instability featuring large deposit withdrawals.
42
“Fear of floating” has also set in motion a vicious circle where the lack of exchange rate
flexibility leads market participants to take further foreign currency risks, which in turn
enhances dollarization, thereby strengthening central banks’ “fear of a floating” and
reinforcing exchange rate inflexibility. In turn, the “peso problem” is typically manifested by
high real interest rates in domestic currency. It represents the markets’ perception of a
potential risk, albeit minimum, of a sudden depreciation of the domestic currency. Strictly
speaking, high real interest rates also capture “country risk” and “banking crises risk,” and
hence, they have emerged following periods of fiscal fragility and/or financial instability.
High real interest rates are observed in a number of countries in the region but are a
particularly distorting feature in Brazil.
43
                                                
41 An assessment of the risks and benefits of financial dollarization is out of the scope of this document. This
analysis is conducted in De Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2005).
42 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002), where they coined the term “fear of floating.”
43 High interest rates in Brazil may also capture other distortions such as an appropriate legal framework that
institutionalize the independence of the central bank.23
Correcting these distortions—high financial dollarization and the “peso problem”—will take
a considerable length of time and will require the support of government policies. The
institutional strengthening envisaged in the legal reform of central banks has been a major
step in the right direction, complemented with the modernization of the design and execution
of monetary policy and the implementation of policies aimed at building institutional
capacity. However, central banks need to persevere in consolidating their reputation by
meeting their inflation targets, on the basis of maintaining operational independence within
long-term decision-making horizons, and enhancing accountability and transparency.
In terms of government policies, strengthening prudential regulations applicable to foreign
exchange transactions is crucial to reestablish an independent monetary policy. While a set of
good practices is still nonexistent, a number of measures may be adopted with the aim of
encouraging the use of local currency vis à vis the U.S. dollar or other foreign currency. For
instance, rising capital requirements in light of increases in foreign currency loans will take
its toll on bank shareholders and will discourage borrowing in foreign currency. Establishing
differentiated insurance premiums—within deposit insurance systems—to penalize foreign
currency deposits will also act as an incentive for de-dollarizing financial systems.
Nevertheless, these measures could work provided they are adopted in an environment of
strong macroeconomic fundamentals. Other than these, de-dollarization efforts should be part
of a broad strategy based on national consensus about economic, political, and social
foundations for long-term stability and economic growth, which also seems to be necessary
to restore confidence in domestic currencies.
Targeting the exchange rate and its aftermath
In other countries in the region, mostly in Central America, dollarization has also taken its
roots as they are small and very open economies with close commercial ties to the United
States. These countries increasingly adopted the U.S. dollar as a means of payment;
meanwhile, given that exchange rate fluctuations exert a significant influence on price
formation, central banks have decided to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to guide
inflation expectations. In this environment, dollarization of liabilities became increasingly
high, to the point where real depreciations could inflict a marked negative impact on the
financial obligations of individuals, companies, and the government, and hence, "fear of
floating" also became an issue.
Without question, the use of an exchange rate anchor helped bringing down inflation in these
countries, although it also borne costs and vulnerabilities. The main drawback is the lack of a
rapid and low-cost exit strategy from the exchange rate peg, which is critical in light of
recurrent real and financial shocks that hit most countries in the region. In addition, the use of
an exchange rate peg precluded central banks from conducting monetary policy, and hence,
developing the skills necessary to formulate and manage monetary policy and building
credibility was not really necessary. The latter turned into a costly shortcoming when the
countries were forced to exit the peg, for example in the midst of a financial crisis.24
Looking ahead, central banks in this group of countries need to assess whether it is wise to
continue with the current monetary regime or to shift to an alternative scheme. This means
weighing the benefits of keeping the exchange rate anchor—once inflation has been brought
down to single-digit levels but still without lowering it to the international level—against the
potential costs embedded in such a regime. If the decision is to stay with the peg, central
banks will need to maintain a higher level of international reserves than would be necessary
under a flexible regime, to assure the markets that the exchange rate will be held stable, even
in the face of exogenous and policy-induced shocks. In addition, although fiscal discipline
and the soundness of the financial system are necessary conditions for the proper functioning
of any monetary regime, they are especially important under fixed or quasi-fixed exchange
rate regimes because of the devastating macroeconomic consequences of a disorderly exit
from the peg stemming from loose fiscal and financial polices. This is the lesson of several
recent episodes, in which exchange rate anchors were abandoned in the midst of fiscal and/or
financial crises and exerted very high macroeconomic costs (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Mexico are valid cases in point).
Should the decision to migrate to a flexible exchange rate regime is adopted, the transition
should be gradual. This strategy will give central banks time to learn how to conduct
monetary policy and improve their understanding of its transmission mechanism.
Simultaneously, central banks would have to invest in building reputation and gaining
credibility, based on their ability to meet monetary targets and reduce inflation, an objective
that can only be achieved over time.
Under a flexible exchange regime, a relevant question is whether central banks should pursue
a monetary targeting strategy or if they should adopt an IT regime. This query relates to the
debate about whether IT regimes demand pre-requirements for its implementation. There is
no consensus on this issue. Some consider that certain prerequisites are desirable but not
essential, since the adoption of an IT regime brings about an endogenous learning process
over time (see Truman, 2003, for example). Our view is that, before announcing a
commitment to an IT scheme, central banks must put in place some fundamental conditions
to assure the proper functioning of the new regime and minimize the risk of initial failures,
which may undermine the success of the IT regime. The following four conditions should be
included at the very least: (i) having an appropriate legal framework which identifies price
stability as central bank's primary objective, empowers the central bank with political and
operational independence to achieve such objective, and establishes rigorous accountability
and transparency mechanisms; (ii) eliminating for practical purposes any other primary goal,
whether explicit or implicit, including the stability of the exchange rate; (iii) eliminating
fiscal dominance, if it exists; and (iv) strengthening the financial system.
44 On the other hand,
having in place basic institutional capacities may also be crucial to run a policy regime that
relies on more sophisticated expertise. On the other hand, countries featuring low developed
                                                
44 Carare et al. (2002) contains a detailed discussion of the initial conditions that need to be established in order
to support an IT regime.25
financial markets and a stable money demand, may find more effective and easier to handle a
monetary targeting regime.
If countries irreversibly abandon their currency, thereby giving up their right to make
monetary policy, the question is whether there is any reason for the existence of a central
bank. So far, none of the recently dollarized economies in Latin America—Ecuador and
El Salvador—has tackled this question formally, and so their central banks continue to exist,
performing tasks of secondary importance vis à vis central bank's basic functions of issuing
money and conducting monetary policy.
45 Operating these institutions, however, bears costs
that society has to pay. An alternative to maintaining the costly status quo or to closing down
central banks would be to give them the fundamental responsibility of financial supervision,
by taking over or merging them with the public institutions in charge of these duties—and
perhaps having them continue performing other secondary functions as they do now.
C.   Coping with Capital Inflows While Maintaining Policy Consistency
Monetary policy consistency is instrumental to underpin credibility, a key pre-requisite to
achieve long-run price stability. If markets are unable to anticipate and understand the
decisions of central banks, and if central banks lack a consistent policy reaction function,
monetary policy will be less effective in reducing inflation and the existence of an inflation
bias will perpetuate. In this environment, monetary policy efforts directed to reduce inflation
will demand higher interest rates than otherwise, which will imply a higher “sacrifice ratio.”
Following the institutional reform of central banks, policy inconsistency decreased
significantly in Latin America as political influence on central bank decisions was mostly
eradicated. Nonetheless, while policy surprises associated to sudden monetary expansion
became less important, inconsistencies remained in a few central banks, this time as a result
of using the exchange rate as nominal anchor to reduce inflation. Thus, central banks
targeting the real exchange rate generally devoted their energies to defend the exchange rate
peg, which at times were in conflict with the objective of achieving price stability.
The recent surge of capital inflows has put additional pressure on the consistency of
monetary policy in the Latin American economies. As capital inflows soared, domestic
currencies faced pressures for an exchange rate appreciation, leading central banks to the
dilemma of whether or not to intervene in the exchange rate market to avoid a real
appreciation. The 2004–2005 oil supply shock has further complicated central banks’ policy
response to capital inflows as it triggered a slight rebound in inflation in most countries. To
keep inflation pressures—even if they are only moderate—from contaminating wage
negotiations and other contracts, in many cases central banks have increased interest rates.
                                                
45 In those countries central banks perform the role of fiscal agency, regulate and coordinate the payment
system, invest international reserves, carry out macroeconomic studies, and recover portfolio assets which were
pledged as collateral in exchange for the loans granted during previous episodes of banking crises26
However, higher interest rates have attracted additional capital inflows, thereby exacerbating
appreciation pressures on the domestic currencies. Similar issues have arisen in oil exporting
countries in the region, given the significant increase in oil revenues as a result of the spike in
crude prices.
As oppose to the recent past, today the real appreciation of domestic currencies is not
welcome any more. In 2004, most central banks in the region, including some of the IT
countries, intervened intensively in the exchange market to mitigate real appreciation
pressures.
46 At least two factors help to explain the opposition to accept today’s appreciation
trend. The first is that inflation in the region is not perceived any more as a problem, and
hence, the appreciation of the domestic currencies appears generating only costs but no
benefits. The second factor is the loss of competitiveness of exports as today they face a
fierce foreign competition, especially from Asia, which puts at risk investment and
employment.
As illustrated in Figure 7, a number of central banks—Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru are
some examples in the region—have followed the course of exchange rate intervention,
although they did not always succeeded in deterring real exchange rate appreciation. As a
positive externality, international reserves held by the central bank increased, although at the
cost of increasing sterilization, which led to a negative impact on central banks’ income
statements. In turn, a few central banks in the region decided not to intervene, or they did it
but not on regular basis, like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
None of these two policy alternatives is costless, but probably central banks’ intervention is
more costly in a long-term perspective. While foreign exchange interventions are not
abnormal, even in IT emerging markets, the problem is really the reason underlying
interventions. A frequent and/or abundant intervention may signal the purpose of preserving
external competitiveness, and not simply, for instance, the desire of mitigating short-term
episodes of exchange rate volatility. The nature of this intervention raises concerns about
central banks caring about the competitiveness of exports—an objective not envisaged in
central banks’ charter—which at times may be in contradiction with the objective of price
stability. Moreover, one can question the de facto independence of monetary policy because
central banks intervention may well respond to external pressures indirectly exerted—
through the government—by market participants, which lose with the appreciation of the
domestic currency.
                                                
46 Intervention has taken place not only by outright sales of international reserves, but also using financial
instruments such as options and swaps.27























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































       Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.28
Furthermore, central banks’ intervention may be damaging from an institutional standpoint,
in particular for IT central banks. Given that IT central banks in the region have publicly
committed with price stability as their fundamental objective, switching to a policy of
avoiding exchange rate appreciation may revive concerns about policy conflicts, as the
appreciation would help to curb inflation pressures. Furthermore, switching short-term policy
emphasis to focus on exchange rate stability will damage central banks’ predictability, a key
feature in which central banks have made a valuable and sustained investment.
On the other hand, when central banks do not intervene in the foreign currency market, the
appreciation trend will eventually disappear, provided domestic interest rates adjust
downward to eliminate differentials vis-à-vis the world interest rate. In the event that a real
appreciation materializes, this may help to moderate inflation pressures stemming from the
oil shock in the current juncture. To cope with the cost on tradable activities, domestic
producers may have to absorb losses.  In the long-run, central banks may not be very
effective in containing the real appreciation because the real exchange rate is an endogenous
variable. Thus, the appropriate way to mitigate the effects of the real appreciation is having
tradable activities increase productivity.
















































































































































































             Source: Western Hemisphere Department, IMF.29
Current exogenous shocks stress the need of additional structural changes in Latin America,
in particular in the labor market. Making the economies more flexible will allow them to
better adjust to moderate the adverse effects of exogenous shocks. It may also allow to soften
the cyclical pattern of the real exchange rate, which tend to evolve in the long-run through an
equilibrium path (Figure 8).
D.   The Perils of Financial System Weaknesses and the Lack of Fiscal Discipline
While the objective of price stability is clearly a central bank responsibility, it may not be
attainable and, in particular, may not be sustainable in the long-run, without the support of
other conditions that are out of the scope of central banks. Two key threatens to the objective
of price stability are potential financial system weaknesses and a deteriorating fiscal stance.
47
These two distortions can place an upward pressure to interest rates and eventually may
trigger a rebound in inflation.
The need to preserve sound financial systems
Banking crises have been a common and recurrent event in Latin America with disastrous
macroeconomic and social effects (Carstens et al., 2004). In particular, since 1990, banking
crises have been the main cause of inflation reversals and economic contraction in many
countries (see Figure 9). From a microeconomic perspective, in a number of episodes the
management of systemic crises left a legacy of market discipline relaxation as a result of the
provision of blanket guarantees and widespread debt restructuring plans, while depositors'
confidence suffered a long-term damage because of breaches of contracts such as freezing
and reprogramming of deposits.
Central banks in Latin America have been intensively involved in the management of
banking crises and resolution, whether or not the crisis posed a systemic threat—which in
theory would have justified such intervention. The resulting monetization was not costless.
On the contrary, it exacerbated macroeconomic instability, including in a number of cases a
simultaneous banking and currency crisis. Central banks’ participation in bank resolution
also damaged their financial position as a result of the purchase of assets—received in
exchange for liquidity and solvency loans provided in the midst of the crises—which has
proven to be difficult to recover overtime.
Most countries in the region have made progress in establishing an appropriate framework
for preventing and managing banking crises, but more needs to be done. The new reforms
must emphasize precautionary regulations because the experience shows that once a crisis
erupts the costs are inexorably high. The countries should focus on improving early warning
mechanisms and, more important, on empowering bank regulators to act effectively at an
                                                
47 In this paper we are assuming that financial systems’ surveillance is not a central bank responsibility, like in
the majority of countries in Latin America.30
early stage to deal with incipient banks liquidity and solvency problems.
48 In addition, the
legal framework for bank restructuring and resolution must be improved to allow countries to
manage and resolve banking crises in an effective way. Major reforms and new procedures
should facilitate and make more effective the conduct of “purchase and assumption”
operations as the main instrument of bank resolution. The costs of the crisis should be
absorbed by financial institutions’ shareholders and by large depositors, whereas any residual
cost should be borne by the government and not by the central bank.















































































































































































































































































































Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
                                                
48 The experience of recent banking crises in Latin America shows that bank regulators tend to act when
liquidity and solvency problems were already irreversible.31
As part of this reform, the role of central banks in the prevention and management of banking
crises should be clearly established in law. Leaving open the door for the monetization of
banking crises may threaten central banks’ objective of price stability and may pose moral
hazard risks. Central banks may be under pressure to provide easy money to finance banking
crises, in particular in countries that feature weak institutions, thereby amplifying
macroeconomic instability. Having generous access to central bank resources is equivalent to
providing leeway to bankers and depositors to take excessive risks. In turn, governments may
feel encouraged to postpone banking resolution decisions as they count at any time on low
cost funds from the central bank, without measuring properly the potential costs of delaying
decisions aimed at adopting lasting bank resolution decisions.
However, the regulatory framework to restrict central banks’ involvement in banking crises
must be an integral part of the legal reform aimed at preventing and managing banking crises.
Furthermore, the legal provisions that limit the monetization of banking crises should enter
into effect only once the regulations to manage banking crises and resolution are in place—
based on the use of private sector and fiscal resources. Regarding lender-of-last-resort
assistance, these provisions should be bounded to short-term loans directed to illiquid but
solvent banks.
The importance of having strong public finances
A second key potential source of vulnerability to the objective of price stability in Latin
America is the reemergence of fiscal deficits. After an initial period of fiscal consolidation
during the early 1990s in most countries in the region, fiscal deficits have increased again in
a number of countries, in some cases reflecting the burden associated to the legacy of
previous banking crises. While public expenditure financing from central banks is already
restricted following the institutional reform of central banks, increasing fiscal deficits are
conducive to a rise in public debt as the only remaining source of government financing as
observed in most countries in the region (see Figure 10).
The effect of a lack of fiscal discipline and an increasing debt burden is that countries may
feature high real interest rates and a surge in “country risk” indicators. A tight monetary
policy combined with a loose fiscal stance produces an inconsistent policy mix, which leads
to an upward trend in interest rates as central banks multiply efforts to preserve markets’
confidence on inflation targets. In an environment of high interest rates, the room of
maneuver of monetary policy is limited and conducive to an enhanced “sacrifice ratio.” In
the limit, the deteriorating fiscal stance may turn unsustainable, thereby leading to a currency






















































































































































































































































































































Source: Western Hemisphere Department, IMF.In light of a potential additional deterioration of public finances, a number of Latin American
governments have the responsibility of reestablishing fiscal discipline to underpin central
bank efforts to abate inflation. Central banks can do little to curb inflation expectations
associated to large fiscal deficits and an unsustainable public debt, except rising interest
rates—which may not be sustainable in the current juncture—as a way of alerting the
markets about the perils of lax fiscal policies in relation to their medium and long-run
objective of achieving price stability. An alternative course of action could be that
governments approve “fiscal responsibility laws,” like Brazil did, which seems to be
providing encouraging results.
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recent major developments in monetary policy in Latin America are of an institutional
nature. A major central bank reform was adopted in almost all countries in the region, which,
in general, focused their mandate on seeking and preserving price stability, enhanced central
banks’ autonomy, in particular in the use of monetary instruments, and held them
accountable with respect to the actions adopted to attain their policy mandate. Despite this
achievement, progress is uneven across countries, with political independence and
transparency of policy decisions being fertile areas for further reform.
Under the new institutional framework, monetary policy acquired a protagonist role in most
countries of the region. They abandoned exchange rate pegs in the wake of financial crises,
but increasingly built confidence in their ability to formulate and execute monetary policy
and eventually arrest inflation. This has been a remarkable achievement in those countries
that implemented inflation targeting regimes. The operational framework of monetary policy
has also evolved such that today more central banks are using a short-run interest rate as a
policy rate and to signal the stance of monetary policy.
The results of the institutional reform of monetary policy are encouraging. In line with the
main objective of the reform, inflation has dropped to single-digit rates in a majority of
countries of the region. Empirical evidence indicates that the legal CBI, in conjunction with
other macroeconomic policies, contributed to the fall of inflation, although causality has not
been established. The latter is not surprising since most legal reforms were approved when
the declining trend of inflation had already started. On these grounds, one can say that while
granting independence to central banks did not cause lower inflation in Latin America, it did
served to consolidate its downward trend by laying the ground for a monetary policy that
effectively anchors inflation expectations.
Despite the tremendous success in abating inflation, there is no room for complacency.
Today, central banks still need to address three important challenges. First, to drive inflation
to international levels, as a measure of price stability, minimizing at the same time the
“sacrifice ratio” associated with the disinflation process. Second, to foster confidence in the
domestic currencies, not only as a means of payment, but also as a store of value, to reduce
the vulnerabilities stemming from dollarization and to enhance monetary policy’s room ofmaneuver. And third, to maintain the consistency of monetary policy in the wake of the new
wave of capital inflows, which is fueled by a propitious international environment and
attracted by improved stability conditions and favorable regional prospects.
While an enhanced reputation and credibility will be key to successfully overcoming the first
challenge—at least from the part of central banks—this may not be sufficient to restore
confidence in the domestic currencies in a number of countries in the region. De-dollarization
is expected to take place gradually as a result of maintaining solid macroeconomic
fundamentals and the adoption of microeconomic regulations aimed at discouraging
transactions in foreign currency. Likewise, measures to weather distortions created by capital
inflows also require a strategy that exceeds central bank responsibilities. As a matter of
principle, central banks should stick to price stability as their primary objective, and
exchange rate interventions should be limited to curtailing excessive volatility in the foreign
exchange market. To cope with the cost on tradable activities associated with the exchange
rate appreciation, domestic producers should seek to improve productivity. Meanwhile,
governments should deepen structural reforms to make their economies more flexible
(including the labor market) and better able to withstand exogenous shocks.
In general, central banks will not succeed in their endeavors unless governments ensure
global macroeconomic and financial stability. In particular, central banks’ success also
hinges on governments’ abilities to preserve the soundness and stability of the financial
systems and to keep fiscal deficits in check. Finally, governments should make sure that
actions speak louder than words in supporting the autonomy of central banks, demanding in
exchange rigorous accountability and transparency procedures from monetary policy.REFERENCES
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LEGAL CBI AND INFLATION: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This appendix highlights some empirical regularities of the association between enhanced
legal CBI and inflation in Latin America—albeit without establishing causality from one to
the other. As opposed to other regions, the contribution of legal CBI towards reducing
inflation in Latin America has received little attention in the literature.
49
Using panel regressions, Table A1 shows that legal CBI contributes to explain the downward
trend in inflation during the period 1990-2002.
50 Legal CBI is measured through the
“modified Cukierman index” referred in section II of this paper and is applied to the pre and
post reform period. The result is robust to the inclusion of a broader indicator of structural
reforms that usually go along with changes in central bank legislation, illustrating the
complementary nature of various aspects of economic reform.
51 The regression also includes
two dummy variables to control for other potential influences in price formation and to limit
the adverse statistical effect of a missing variables problem. The first dummy variable seeks
to isolate the effect on inflation of systemic banking crises.
52 In turn, the second is intended
to capture the influence on disinflation from fixed and hard-peg exchange rate regimes—
measured on the basis of a de facto criterion, according to the IMF's classification of
countries' exchange rate regimes. In addition, the analysis controls for world inflation
(measured in terms of the average inflation in the G-7 countries) to take into account the
potential influence of external inflation in the disinflation process in Latin America.
                                                
49 For studies that look at developed countries, see for example the seminal work by Grilli, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini (1991) and those by Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), Eijffinger, Schaling, and Hoeberichts (1998), and
Brumm (2000). The transition economies have also received some attention (see for example Loungani and
Sheets, 1997 and Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti, 2002). While the influential study by Cukierman (1992)
included some Latin American countries as part of a large sample of industrial and developing countries, it
covers a time span prior to the 1990s in which the legal reform took place in the region.
50 The specifics of the methodology used in this statistical exercise are similar to those discussed in Jácome and
Vázquez (2005) for a sample that also includes the Caribbean countries.
51 This variable takes a value in the range of 0 to 1, with higher variables reflecting deeper structural reforms.
The data is obtained from the structural reform index calculated for Latin America by the Inter-American
Development Bank. The index incorporates reforms in the trade, tax, financial, and labor spheres, and also
includes privatization (see Lora, 2001).
52 For this dummy variable, a value of 1 is assigned in the years when a systemic banking crisis occurred and 0
elsewhere.Table A1. Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America
(Panel regressions of inflation on lagged CBI data)





















































Number of observations 158 147 133 117
Number of countries 17 17 17 17
Rho 0.56 0.50 0.40 0.33
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10 percent, ** Significant at 5 percent, *** Significant at 1 percent.
The coefficients were estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares, allowing for heteroscedasticity across
countries and an AR(1) autocorrelation structure within countries, with a (Rho) coefficient common to all countries.
Dummy Banking Crises equals 1 during years with banking crises and 0 elsewhere. Dummy Exchange Rate Regime
equals 1 during periods of fixed exchange regimes and 0 elsewhere. World inflation is measured by the average
inflation of industrial countries (IFS series 110), and the index of structural reforms varies in the interval [0, 1] with
higher values indicating deeper economic reforms.
The analysis is conducted lagging the CBI index with respect to the year of approval of the
institutional reform of monetary policy in each country. The purpose of lagging this variable
is to capture a learning process associated to the new institutional framework and the
development of the expertise required to operate under the new setting. In addition, the lags
make room for a process of building credibility, which increases central bank chances of
reducing inflation.
As reported in Table A1, the coefficients of all variables have the expected sign and are
statistically significant at least at 5 percent. In particular, the level of significance of the
coefficient of the variable CBI improves as the lag increases to three periods, which is
consistent with the idea that central banks gain ability to defeat inflation as they build
credibility and achieve expertise in the conduct of monetary policy.Documentos de Trabajo
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